Retaliatory Launch Only After Detonation (RLOAD)
Ironically, the US and Russia are also unwilling to publicly state that they will not employ LoW. It is arguable that a commitment by both nations to abandon LoW and substitute a policy of Retaliatory Launch Only After Detonation (RLOAD) would eliminate the possibility of an accidental nuclear war based upon a false warning of attack. RLOAD would also prevent the launch of a nuclear retaliatory strike in the event of an attack with ICBMs armed with conventional warheads (that did not produce nuclear detonations).
While RLOAD would not prevent nuclear war in the event of a real attack, the adoption of this policy (and the subsequent elimination of all war-fighting options that included Launch-on-Warning) would immediately reduce to zero the chances of an accidental nuclear war based upon a false warning. Adoption of RLOAD policy could be done quickly via presidential initiative, and it would not require negotiation, verification, symmetrical force reductions or great expenditures to accomplish.
RLOAD clearly does not resolve the fundamental dangers posed by nuclear weapons or nuclear war, but it could be used to remove the danger of accidental nuclear war based upon a false warning while more substantial disarmament efforts are underway. Adoption of RLOAD by one side could also be seen as a confidence building measure designed to lower tensions and also to encourage the other side to make the same step.